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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a new class of OR games: economic lot-sizing (ELS) games.
There are a number of retailers that have a known demand for a ﬁxed number of periods.
To satisfy demand the retailers order products at the same manufacturer. By placing joint
orders instead of individual orders, costs can be reduced and a cooperative game arises. In
this paper we show that ELS games are balanced. Furthermore, we show that two special
classes of ELS games are concave.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a new type of inventory/production game. The model underlying the
cooperative game is the classical Wagner-Whitin or the (somewhat more general) economic lot-
sizing (ELS) problem. Wagner and Whitin (1958) were the ﬁrst who studied this OR problem and
it can be described as follows. Given a known demand for a ﬁnite discrete time horizon, one has
to ﬁnd a production plan such that total costs are minimized. Relevant costs include setup cost,
production cost and holding cost.
Consider the following ELS situation in which a number of retailers sell the same product.
They order the product at a single manufacturer, store it for some periods and sell it to the
customers. Furthermore, assume that the manufacturer charges ordering and production costs
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1for a single order. Now by cooperating the retailers may obtain a cost saving. Namely, if the
retailers place one big order instead of placing individual orders total ordering costs will be smaller.
Moreover, production cost can also be reduced by merging their production plans. A prime
question then becomes how to share the minimal total joint costs. To answer this question we
analyze a corresponding TU-game in which the value for each coalition is determined by minimizing
its total costs by joint ordering. So the players in this game are the retailers. We will call this
game the ELS game related to the underlying ELS situation.
A practical situation to which the ELS game may apply is for example a corporation with
several ﬁnancially independent divisions that have a demand for the same item. The corporation
has the policy to make joint orders for the divisions in order to minimize total joint costs. Of
course the corporation is faced with the internal problem of fairly splitting these costs to the
various divisions.
In this paper we will focus on the balancedness, the core and concavity of ELS games. The core
of a game consists of stable cost divisions of the total joint costs in which no subset of players has
a direct incentive to leave the grand coalition, because this will increase the cost for each subset
of players. A cooperative game has a non-empty core if and only it is balanced (Bondareva (1963)
and Shapley (1967)). A well-known class of balanced games are concave or submodular games.
For a concave game it holds that the marginal contribution (in terms of cost) of a single player to
a coalition equals at least the marginal contribution of that player to a larger coalition. Concave
games are known to have nice properties. Namely, for concave games, the core of the game is
equal to the convex hull of the marginal vectors (see Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981)) and, as a
result, the Shapley-value is the barycenter of the core. Furthermore, the kernel coincides with the
nucleolus and the bargaining set and the core coincide (see Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972)).
In the literature there are two recent papers that are closely related to our work: Guardiola,
Meca and Puerto (2005) and Meca, Timmer, Garcia-Jurado and Borm (2004). The paper by
Guardiola et al. (2005) discusses the literature on inventory centralization games and considers
a production/inventory situation where players can cooperate by sharing production facilities
and warehouse facilities, i.e., items are produced, stored and backlogged by the player with,
respectively, the lowest production, holding and backlogging costs. The corresponding game is
called a production-inventory game. The main results derived by Guardiola et al. (2005) are that
production-inventory games are totally balanced and that the Owen set reduces to a singleton.
The major diﬀerence between Guardiola et al. (2005) and the current paper is in the underlying
OR problem. Our underlying model is the ELS problem, where a setup cost is incurred when
2an order is placed, which makes the cost structure non-linear. Guardiola et al. (2005), on the
contrary, assume linear production, holding and backlogging costs, which makes the problem
easier to analyze. In fact, it is not diﬃcult to show that in their setting the optimal production
plan can be determined by considering all demand periods independently, whereas in the ELS
problem the optimal ordering plan depends on the sizes of the demands of consecutive periods.
Meca et al. (2004) consider a class of inventory games that arise when there is a possibility of
joint ordering in an economic order quantity (EOQ) environment. The underlying OR problem
is the well-known EOQ model, which was already introduced by Harris (see Harris (1913)). In
this continuous time model with inﬁnite horizon it is assumed that a single ﬁrm faces a constant
demand rate. The objective of the ﬁrm is to minimize its inventory and ordering costs. Meca et al.
(2004) extend this analysis to the situation where a collection of ﬁrms tries to minimize their total
ordering and inventory costs by joint ordering. They analyze a corresponding cooperative game
and focus on cost division rules. Our ELS game can be seen as a discrete version of the model by
Meca et al. (2004) with a ﬁnite horizon and time varying demand.
Besides the area of inventory management, the application of cooperative game theory in other
OR areas has received much attention. In short an OR game consists of multiple players that not
only face a joint optimization problem that arises from some OR related problem, but also face the
additional problem of how to allocate the cost savings or revenues among the players. A survey
of OR games can be found in Borm, Hamers and Hendrickx (2001). Here, next to production and
inventory games, OR games on connection (e.g. ﬁxed tree and spanning tree), routing (e.g. Chinese
postman and travelling salesman) and scheduling (e.g. sequencing, permutation and assignment)
are discussed.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we will describe the ELS model and we recall
the well-known Wagner-Whitin algorithm that solves an ELS problem instance. In section 3 we
will introduce ELS games and give an example. In section 4 we will prove that ELS games are
balanced. The proof is obtained by merging production plans (of balanced collections) of coalitions
to production plans of the grand coalition in such a way that we can show the balancedness
conditions of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)). In
section 5 we consider two special classes of ELS games that are concave: the ELS game with equal
demand for each player and the 2-period ELS game.
32 The ELS model
In this section we introduce the ELS model. The ELS problem can be described as follows. For a
ﬁxed model horizon T there is a known demand for a single item per time period. This demand
has to be satisﬁed each period by producing in this period or in previous periods, i.e., back-logging
is not allowed. Relevant cost typically include production costs and holding (inventory) costs. The
production costs consist of a ﬁxed component (setup or ordering cost) and unit production cost.
The goal is to determine how much to produce in each period so as to minimize the total costs.
If for each period t = 1;:::;T we let
dt = demand in period t
Kt= setup or ordering cost in period t
ht = holding cost in period t
pt = unit production cost in period t
xt = items produced in period t
It = ending inventory in period t,




Kt±(xt) + ptxt + Itht
s.t. It = It¡1 + xt ¡ dt; t = 1;:::;T







0 for x = 0
1 for x > 0:
So C(d) denotes the total cost when demand equals d = [d1;:::;dT ] in periods 1;:::;T . Wag-
ner and Whitin (1958) propose a forward dynamic programming algorithm to ﬁnd the optimal
production plan. They show that there exists an optimal solution with the property
It¡1xt = 0 for t = 1;:::;T : (1)
That is, production only takes place if inventory drops down to zero. This is the so-called zero-
inventory (ZI) property. Because back-logging is not allowed, this implies that there exists an
optimal solution for which
xt = 0 or xt =
k X
i=t
di with 1 · t · k · T : (2)
4So a production plan is completely determined by its production periods, where a production
period is deﬁned as a period with non-zero production.
Let c(s;t) be the cost to satisfy demand in periods s;:::;t with a setup only in period s, i.e.,










Furthermore, let F(t) be the minimal cost of the production plan for period 1 through t and let
F(0) = 0, then
F(t) = min
i=1;:::;t
fF(i ¡ 1) + c(i;t)g:
Wagner and Whitin show that this algorithm runs in O(T 2) time. After applying this recursion
(called the Wagner-Whitin algorithm), the optimal production plan can be easily obtained by
back-tracking. Note that this recursion formula only works for problem instances with strictly
positive demand in period 1, which will be the case in this paper.
More sophisticated algorithms have been developed by Federgruen and Tzur (1991), Wagel-
mans, Van Hoesel and Kolen (1992) and Aggarwal and Park (1993). They show that a general ELS
problem instance can be solved in O(T logT ) time and a problem instance without speculative
motives (i.e., pt + ht ¸ pt+1 for t = 1;:::;T ¡ 1) can be solved in O(T ) time. For more details
on the ELS problem we refer to these papers. We illustrate the ELS problem by the following
example.
Example 1 Consider a 6-period ELS problem instance with parameters according to table 1.
One can verify that by applying the Wagner-Whitin algorithm the optimal solution of the problem
t 1 2 3 4 5 6
dt 15 11 12 6 7 16
Kt 40 40 40 40 40 40
pt 0 0 0 0 0 0
ht 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Problem instance of example 1
is to produce 44 items in period 1 and 23 items in period 5 (that is x1 = 44;x5 = 23 and
x2 = x3 = x4 = x6 = 0). Total costs corresponding to this production plan equal 149 (setup cost:
40 + 40 = 80 and holding cost: 1 ¢ 11 + 2 ¢ 12 + 3 ¢ 6 + 1 ¢ 16 = 69). Note that for simplicity we
have taken stationary cost parameters. Of course, in the case of non-stationary cost parameters
the Wagner-Whitin algorithm can also be applied.
53 The economic lot-sizing game
In this section we introduce ELS games. Consider a set of retailers N = f1;:::;ng that sell
the same item. They all have a known demand for a T -period model horizon. All retailers buy
the items at the same manufacturer. When a retailer places an order, the manufacturer charges
ordering cost and production cost, which is linear in the amount of items ordered. Furthermore,
when a retailer carries inventory from one period to the next period to satisfy future demand,
holding costs are incurred. We assume that in a single period holding costs are equal for each
retailer. Now a single retailer tries to minimize its total ordering, production and holding costs.
Note that this is exactly the situation as in the ELS problem, where setup cost in the ELS problem
corresponds to ordering cost in the ELS game.
If a collection of retailers cooperates in the above setting, a cost saving may be obtained.
Namely, instead of placing individual orders the retailers can place a joint order and save ordering
cost. It is not diﬃcult to see that it is always proﬁtable for two (or more) retailers to cooperate.
Namely, if we have two optimal production plans we can construct a new production plan, where
the amount ordered in each period is the sum of the amount ordered in the two individual plans.
That is, if xi
t and x
j
t are the amounts ordered by retailer i and j in period t, respectively, then the
amount ordered in the newly constructed production plan is xi
t + x
j
t. This production plan has
total cost equal to the sum of the individual production plans if none of the production periods
coincide. If one or more production periods coincide, a gain is obtained, because less setup costs
are incurred. Later on we will show that in general even higher cost savings can be obtained.
As mentioned above equal holding costs are assumed for each retailer. This assumption can be
easily justiﬁed in the context of one corporation with several divisions. If we drop the assumption
of equal holding cost, the underlying OR problem is not equal to the ELS problem anymore, but
it becomes more complex, because we have to diﬀerentiate over the retailers when calculating the
holding cost. As a result, the corresponding game becomes harder to analyze and it would be
interesting to investigate whether the results derived in this paper still hold.
To describe the game mathematically, let di be the demand vector of player (retailer) i and let





Then the optimal production plan for coalition S can be found by applying the Wagner-Whitin
algorithm to demand vector dS obtaining a total cost of C(dS). Now an ELS situation can be
described by the tuple Γ = hN;T ;D;K;p;hi, where N is the set of players, T the model horizon,
6D the n £ T demand matrix (with row i corresponding to the demand vector di of player i), K
the vector of setup cost, p the vector of unit production cost and h the vector of holding cost.
Note that a vector (and not a matrix) is suﬃcient to specify the holding cost, because we assume
equal holding cost for each player.
Deﬁnition 1 Let hN;T ;D;K;p;hi be an ELS situation. Then the corresponding ELS game (N;c)
is deﬁned as c(S) = C(dS) for every S ½ N with c(;) = 0.
From the discussion above it immediately follows that ELS games are subadditive, i.e., c(S) +
c(T) ¸ c(S [ T) for all S;T ½ N and S \ T = Ø. We illustrate the ELS game by the following
example.
Example 2 Consider an ELS game with player set N = f1;2;3g. Again we have a 6 period
problem with setup cost Kt = K = 40, unit production cost pt = p = 0, holding cost ht = h = 1
and demand according to table 2. Applying the Wagner-Whitin algorithm to each possible coalition
period t 1 2 3 4 5 6
player 1 15 11 12 6 7 16
player 2 1 16 17 15 1 9
player 3 18 16 8 20 18 2
Table 2: Demand matrix of example 2
yields the optimal cost for each coalition. In table 3 one can ﬁnd the optimal cost for each coalition
with corresponding production plans. For example, the cost of coalition S = f1;3g is calculated
S dS c(S) x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
Ø (0;0;0;0;0;0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f1g (15;11;12;6;7;16) 149 44 0 0 0 23 0
f2g (1;16;17;15;1;9) 140 17 0 42 0 0 0
f3g (18;16;8;20;18;2) 134 42 0 0 40 0 0
f1;2g (16;27;29;21;8;25) 184 43 0 58 0 0 25
f1;3g (33;27;20;26;25;18) 191 60 0 46 0 43 0
f2;3g (19;32;25;35;19;11) 186 19 57 0 65 0 0
f1;2;3g (34;43;37;41;26;27) 223 34 80 0 67 0 27
Table 3: Optimal costs and production plans of example 2
7by applying the Wagner-Whitin algorithm to the vector df1;3g = d1 + d3 = (33;27;20;26;25;18).
Observe that cooperation of player 1 and 3 will lead to a cost saving of 149 + 134 ¡ 191 = 92.
4 On the balancedness of ELS games
In this section we will provide the balancedness result for ELS games. First we recall the notion
of balanced games. Let 2N be the set of all subsets of N. Then B ½ 2N is called a balanced




where eS is the vector in Rn with eS
i = 1 if i 2 S and eS
i = 0 otherwise. Note that we may restrict




for every balanced collection B ½ 2N and corresponding weights ¸S, S 2 B.
To prove balancedness we use the following property of the ELS model. In an ELS model
we may assume without loss of generality that holding costs are zero. This can be derived by
substituting It =
Pt

















di t = 1;:::;T
xt ¸ 0 t = 1;:::;T ;
where
p0
t = pt +
T X
i=t
hi for t = 1;:::;T : (3)
Note that the last term in the objective function is constant and can be omitted. Hence, each
ELS problem instance is equivalent to a similar problem instance with zero holding cost and
each ELS situation Γ = hN;T ;D;K;p;hi can be transformed into an ELS situation with holding
cost zero. We call this transformed ELS situation the zero ELS situation and we denote it by
Γ0 = hN;T ;D;K;p0i. The following example shows a transformed ELS problem instance.




i=1 di = 241.
Substituting p0
t = pt +
P6
i=t hi and h0
t = 0 leads to the transformed ELS problem instance of
8t 1 2 3 4 5 6
dt 15 11 12 6 7 16
Kt 40 40 40 40 40 40
p0
t 6 5 4 3 2 1
h0
t 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Transformed problem instance of example 3
table 4. Again the optimal solution of the problem is to produce 44 items in period 1 and 23 items
in period 5 (that is x1 = 44;x5 = 23 and x2 = x3 = x4 = x6 = 0). Total costs corresponding
to this production plan equal 80 + 310 = 390 (setup cost: 40 + 40 = 80 and production cost:
44 ¢ 6 + 23 ¢ 2 = 310), so that the optimal costs of the original problem equal 390 ¡ 241 = 149.
As a consequence of the property that an ELS situation can be transformed to a related zero ELS
situation, the following proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 1 Consider an ELS situation Γ and the related zero ELS situation Γ0. Let (N;c)
and (N;c0) be the corresponding ELS games of Γ and Γ0, respectively. Then there exists an additive
game (N;a) such that
c(S) = c0(S) + a(S) for all S ½ N:
Hence, the games (N;c) and (N;c0) are strategically equivalent. So to prove balancedness we can
restrict to games that arise from zero ELS situations.
In the proof we will further use the following convenient notation for production plans. As
noted before production plans are completely described by setting the production periods. Let X
be a production plan. Then Xt = 1 if period t is a production period and Xt = 0 otherwise for
t = 1;:::;T . Further, let pt(X) be the unit production cost of plan X in period t, i.e., pt(X) = pi
with i = maxfj · tjXj = 1g. So the total cost C(X) (assuming that holding cost is zero) of





For further convenience a plan X with Xt = 0 for t = 1;:::;T is called an empty plan and we
deﬁne pt(X) = 1 for every empty plan X.
Theorem 1 ELS games are balanced.
9Proof By Proposition 1 we may consider an ELS game (N;c) arising from Γ0 = hN;T ;D;K;pi.
Let B be a balanced collection of 2N and let ¸S 2 Q+, S 2 B, be the corresponding weights. It
is suﬃcient to prove that
X
S2B
¸Sc(S) ¸ c(N): (4)
Note that (4) follows immediately for B = fNg. Now let B 6= fNg and let qB 2 N be the smallest
integer for which qB¸S is integral for all S 2 B. Then (4) can be equivalently expressed as
X
S2B
qB¸SC(dS) ¸ qBC(dN): (5)
In the summation at the left hand side of (5) we have qB¸S times the cost of the optimal production
plan corresponding to each coalition S 2 B. So in total we have the cost of nB =
P
S2B qB¸S
production plans. For notational convenience let NB = f1;:::;nBg be the index set of coalitions
(in arbitrary order) and let S(i) be the coalition corresponding to index i. So we have qB¸S indices
for each coalition S 2 B. Furthermore, let Xi be the optimal production plan corresponding to
coalition S(i) (i = 1;:::;nB).
The right hand side of (5) denotes qB times the cost of coalition N. We will show that we
can combine plans Xi (i = 1;:::;nB) to construct plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB). Here Y j denotes a
production plan for coalition N with corresponding cost C(Y j). We will show that the cumulative
costs of plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB) equal at most the cumulative costs of plans Xi (i = 1;:::;nB).
















C(Y j) ¸ qBC(dN);
where the last inequality follows from the optimality of C(dN). Note that nB =
P
S2B qB¸S > qB,
because
P




because B is a balanced collection of 2N and dS =
P
i2S di. This means that the cumulative
demands of plans Xi (i = 1;:::;nB) and plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB) are equal. In the remainder of
the proof we will show how we can construct qB plans Y j out of nB (> qB) plans Xi and why
plans Y j have cumulative costs at most equal to the cumulative costs of plans Xi. The idea is
that we assign setups from plans Xi to plans Y j. The following procedure shows how plans Y j
are constructed out of the plans Xi.
10Y
j
t := 0 (j = 1;:::;qB, t = 1;:::;T )
pmax := 1
For t = 1;:::;T
For i = 1;:::;nB
If Xi
t = 1 and pt(Xi) < pmax Then
k := argmaxj=1;:::;qBfpt(Y j) g
Y k
t := 1




In words the procedure works as follows. We start with empty plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB) and we
iterate over all periods t and over all plans Xi. If we encounter a setup in plan Xi, we assign it
to some plan Y j. But we only assign a new setup if the production cost is strictly smaller than
the maximum current production cost of all plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB). If the latter is true, then
the setup will be assigned to plan Y j with maximum current production cost pt(Y j). This means
that in period t the qB smallest production costs have been assigned to plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB).
Now we will show why this procedure works. That is, we will show why the cumulative costs
of plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB) equal at most the cumulative costs of plans Xi (i = 1;:::;nB). First
note that the cumulative setup costs of plans Y j equal at most the cumulative setup costs of
plans Xi, because by applying the procedure, we use every setup in each plan Xi at most once in














It is now suﬃcient to show that the cumulative production costs of plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB) equal
at most the cumulative production costs of plans Xi (i = 1;:::;nB).
Because a setup is assigned to plan Y j with the maximum value pt(Y j) in period t and no setup
is assigned if the production cost is larger than the maximum value pt(Y j), the set fpt(Y j)gj=1;:::;qB
consists of the qB smallest production costs of the setups in plans Xi
k (i = 1;:::;nB) for periods
k = 1;:::;t. Assume without loss of generality that pt(Y 1) · pt(Y 2) · ¢¢¢ · pt(Y qB). Now
let A be an arbitrary subset of NB with jAj = qB. That is, we choose qB arbitrary coalitions
out of NB with corresponding production plans Xi (i 2 A). Let fpt(Xi)gi2A be the set of
corresponding production costs. We may assume without loss of generality that A = f1;:::;qBg
11and that pt(X1) · pt(X2) · ¢¢¢ · pt(XqB). But then it holds pt(Y j) · pt(Xj) for j = 1;:::;qB.







for every A ½ NB with jAj = qB.
Now consider some player m 2 N and some period t. We will compare the production cost
of player m in period t in production plans Xi (i = 1;:::;nB) and plans Y j (j = 1;:::;qB).
Let Im ½ NB be the index set of coalitions in which player m is contained. Note that we must
have jImj = qB. Let fpt(Xi)gi2Im be the set of corresponding production costs. Then the total






















So the production costs for each player m in each period t are smaller in plans Y j than in plans Xi.



























































































12where the inequality follows from (7) and (11). Hence we have proved (6) and hence the theorem.
¤
The following example shows how the procedure of constructing new plans out of existing plans
works.




2g. In this example we have qB = 2, nB = 3, NB = f1;2;3g, S(1) = f1;2g,
S(2) = f1;3g and S(3) = f2;3g. That means, we construct 2 plans Y 1 and Y 2 out of the 3 plans
X1, X2 and X3. In table 5 the values of Xi
t, Y
j
t , pt(Xi) and pt(Y j) are presented after applying
the procedure described in the proof. Note that in this example we save setup costs in periods 1
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Kt 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
pt 10 8 9 7 4 3 5 2 1
X1
t (pt(X1)) 1 (10) 0 (10) 1 (9) 0 (9) 0 (9) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)
X2
t (pt(X2)) 1 (10) 0 (10) 0 (10) 1 (7) 0 (7) 0 (7) 1 (5) 0 (5) 1 (1)
X3
t (pt(X3)) 1 (10) 1 (8) 0 (8) 1 (7) 1 (4) 0 (4) 0 (4) 1 (2) 0 (2)
Y 1
t (pt(Y 1)) 1 (10) 1 (8) 0 (8) 1 (7) 1 (4) 0 (4) 0 (4) 1 (2) 0 (2)
Y 2
t (pt(Y 2)) 1 (10) 0 (10) 1 (9) 1 (7) 0 (7) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (1)
Table 5: Illustration of the procedure described in the balancedness proof
and 7 both once. Furthermore, note that for every period t and for every A ½ NB with jAj = 2, we
have that production costs for plans Y j (j = 1;2) are pairwise smaller than for plans Xi (i 2 A)
after ordering them. For example, for t = 7 and A = f2;3g = I3 we have p7(Y 2) = 3 · 4 = p7(X3)
and p7(Y 1) = 4 · 5 = p7(X2).
The proof and the example show that we can not only save setup costs by cooperation, but we
can also save production costs. Furthermore, because the holding costs are incorporated in the
(transformed) production costs (see equation (3)), this means that by cooperation also holding
cost can be reduced.
Using theorem 1 and the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley
(1967)) the following corollary holds:
Corollary 2 ELS games have a non-empty core.




zi = c(N) and
X
i2S
zi · c(S) for all S ½ N;S 6= Øg:
135 On the concavity of ELS games
In the previous section it was shown that ELS games are balanced. In this section we will give
two classes of ELS games for which we can prove a stronger result. In particular, we will show
that games within those two classes are concave. A cost game (N;c) is concave if for each i 2 N
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) ¸ c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T) for all S ½ T ½ N n fig: (12)
Concave games have the following nice property. As already mentioned a game is concave if and
only if its core is the convex hull of all marginal vectors (see Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981)),
where a marginal vector is deﬁned as follows. Let Π(N) the set of all orders of N. Let ¾ 2 Π(N)
be an order on the players, i.e., a bijection ¾ : N ! N, where ¾(i) = j means that player i is
at position j. A marginal vector m¾(c) 2 RN with respect to the order ¾ in the game (N;c) is
deﬁned as
m¾
¾¡1(k)(c) = c(fj 2 N : ¾(j) · ¾(k)g) ¡ c(fj 2 N : ¾(j) < ¾(k)g)
for every k 2 N. The following example shows that ELS games are not concave in general.
Example 5 Consider the 3-player 6-period ELS game according to table 6. The optimal costs
t 1 2 3 4 5 6
d1
t 15 5 14 8 20 11
d2
t 1 1 11 17 3 14
d3
t 20 8 1 11 1 19
Kt 1 1 11 17 3 14
ht 5 3 5 4 2 1
pt 1 11 4 7 8 8
Table 6: Problem instance of example 5
and corresponding production plans for each coalition can be found in table 7. One can verify
that
c(f1;2;3g) + c(f1g) = 1393 + 644 = 2037 > 2033 = 1029 + 1004 = c(f1;2g) + c(f1;3g)
c(f1;2;3g) + c(f2g) = 1393 + 511 = 1904 > 1898 = 1029 + 869 = c(f1;2g) + c(f2;3g)
c(f1;2;3g) + c(f3g) = 1393 + 483 = 1876 > 1873 = 1004 + 869 = c(f1;3g) + c(f2;3g);
which even implies that the core contains none of the marginal vectors. For example, the marginal
14S dS c(S) x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
Ø (0;0;0;0;0;0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f1g (15;5;14;8;20;12) 644 43 0 0 0 31 0
f2g (1;1;11;17;3;14) 511 13 0 0 34 0 0
f3g (20;8;1;11;1;19) 483 29 0 0 31 0 0
f1;2g (16;6;25;26;23;25) 1029 22 0 51 0 48 0
f1;3g (35;13;15;20;21;30) 1004 63 0 0 20 51 0
f2;3g (21;9;12;28;4;33) 869 42 0 0 32 0 33
f1;2;3g (36;14;26;37;24;44) 1393 76 0 0 37 68 0
Table 7: Optimal costs and production plans of example 5
vector z corresponding to the order ¾ = (1;2;3) equals
z = m¾(c) = (c(f1g);c(f1;2g) ¡ c(f1g);c(f1;2;3g) ¡ c(f1;2g) = (644;385;364):
But then for coalition f1;3g it holds that
z1 + z3 = c(f1g) + c(f1;2;3g) ¡ c(f1;2g) = 644 + 364 = 1008 > 1004 = c(f1;3g):
Clearly m¾(c) is not a core element, because coalition f1;3g prefers to leave the grand coalition
obtaining a cost of 1004 instead of 1008.
In this section we will give two classes of ELS games that are concave. In the proofs of the
concavity theorems again we assume that holding costs are zero.
Theorem 2 Let Γ = hN;T ;D;K;p;hi be an ELS situation with d1 = d2 = ¢¢¢ = dn = d. Then
the corresponding ELS game (N;c) is concave.
Proof By Proposition 1 it is suﬃcient to consider an ELS game (N;c) arising from a zero ELS
situation. First, we will proof a property of the function C(±d) with ± > 0, that is, C(±d) is
the optimal cost for some positive multiple of the demand vector d. Let P be a production plan
represented by its production periods (in increasing order) and let P(T ) be the set of all possible
production plans. Furthermore, let s(t) be the ﬁrst production period after period t in plan P
and if period t has no successor, then let s(t) = T + 1. Then the cost CP(±d) of production
























and jP(T )j is ﬁnite (jP(T )j = 2T ¡1 if d1 > 0), it follows that C(±d) is the minimum of a ﬁnite
number of linear functions, which implies that C(±d) is piecewise linear concave.
To complete the proof let i 2 N and S ½ T ½ N n fig. Using the concavity of the function
C(±d) and jSj · jTj, we have
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) = C((jSj + 1)d) ¡ C(jSjd) ¸ C((jTj + 1)d) ¡ C(jTjd) = c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T);
where the equalities are justiﬁed by the fact that d = d1 = ¢¢¢ = dn.
¤
Besides the ELS game with equal demands for all players, every 2-period ELS game is also
concave. For a 2-period ELS problem with demand d we have two possible production plans:
² Production plan (1;0):
Produce all demand (d1 + d2) in period 1 incurring costs
K1 + p1(d1 + d2): (13)
² Production plan (1;1):
Produce d1 in period 1 and produce d2 in period 2 incurring costs
K1 + p1d1 + K2 + p2d2: (14)
It is easy to verify from (13) and (14) that we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Plan (1;0) is preferred over plan (1;1) if and only if p1d2 · K2 + p2d2.
Theorem 3 Let Γ = hN;T ;D;K;p;hi be an ELS situation with T = 2. Then the corresponding
ELS game (N;c) is concave.
Proof By Proposition 1 it is suﬃcient to consider an ELS game (N;c) arising from a zero ELS
situation. We will show that (12) holds. Because ELS games are subadditive, (12) holds for S = Ø.
Let S ½ T ½ N n fig with S 6= Ø. We will consider the cases p1 · p2 and p1 > p2.
² p1 · p2:
It immediately follows from Proposition 3 that plan (1;0) is preferred over plan (1;1) for all
possible coalitions. So we have
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) = p1(di
1 + di
2) = c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T):
16coalition S S [ fig T T [ fig
Case 1 (1;0) (1;0) (1;0) (1;0)
Case 2 (1;0) (1;0) (1;0) (1;1)
Case 3 (1;0) (1;0) (1;1) (1;1)
Case 4 (1;0) (1;1) (1;0) (1;1)
Case 5 (1;0) (1;1) (1;1) (1;1)
Case 6 (1;1) (1;1) (1;1) (1;1)
Table 8: Possible combinations of production plans for T = 2 and p1 > p2
² p1 > p2:
For this case the possible combinations of production plans can be found in table 8. Note
that if the optimal plan for e.g. coalition S is (1;1), then it follows from Proposition 3 that
the optimal plan of coalition S[fig also must be (1;1), because p1 > p2. The same argument
applies to T and T [ fig too.
Case 1: Clearly
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) = p1(di
1 + di
2) = c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T):
Case 2: It follows from Proposition 3 that
p1(dT
2 + di

















= c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T):
Case 3: We now have




2 = c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T):
Case 4: Clearly (p2 ¡ p1)dS
2 ¸ (p2 ¡ p1)dT
2 and hence
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) = p1di





1 + K2 + p2(dT
2 + di
2) ¡ p1dT
2 = c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T):





c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) = p1di






2 = c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T):
Case 6: It immediately follows that
c(S [ fig) ¡ c(S) = p1di
1 + p2di
2 = c(T [ fig) ¡ c(T):
¤
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